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Gentile v. State Bar: Core Speech and a Lawyer's 
Pretrial Statements to the Press 
If one stops to consider the collision which occasionally occurs 
between the courts and the press, one discovers that it is a 
contest, not between right and wrong, but between two 
r ights . .  . . In such a tragedy the end is always disas- 
trous. . . . 1 
The media has always been interested in the courtroom, 
not only for its news but also for its entertainment value.2 This 
interest has been fueled recently by sensationalized cases in- 
volving celebrities such as William Kemedy Smith and Mike 
Tyson. A new cable channel, devoted entirely t o  reporting 
trials, has also increased public interest in this area. These 
developments have brought new attention to  an old debate 
about the propriety of a lawyer's statements to the press re- 
garding pending litigation and the need for safeguards to miti- 
gate the difficulty of finding a panel of objective jurors? 
This debate reveals an important point of friction in the 
principles the Supreme Court has developed for applying the 
First Amendment to statutory restrictions and punishment of 
speech. These principles, in rough outline, hold that the nearer 
a person's speech is to  political speech, the "core" of the Free 
Speech Clause, the more compelling a state's reasons for regu- 
lating such speech must be for the regulations to pass First 
Amendment scr~t iny.~ 
1. Simon H. Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON CON~ITUTIONAL L*AW 651, 651 (Edward L. Barrett, Jr. et  al. eds., 
1963). 
2. See id. 
3. A recent political cartoon is illustrative of this problem. The cartoon depicts 
William Kennedy Smith's prosecutor waving her arms and saying, "Now, we don't 
want any hotshot Kennedy lawyers coming in here trying to prejudice a jury by 
manipulating the press. Listen, did you read about those women we found, the 
ones who say RAPE! WILLIE SMITH! RAPE! WILLIE SMITH!" Wright, 
BEACH POST, reprinted in NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, a t  15. 
4. See infra part 1II.A; see also, GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1024 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the different levels of First Amendment protec- 
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One question that arises from this tenet is whether the 
First Amendment standard should differ when states attempt 
to regulate speech that impinges on another constitutionally 
guaranteed right, such as the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court recently had the 
opportunity to address this very question as it relates to the 
speech of attorneys. 
In Gentile v. State ~ a r , ~  the Court considered the propri- 
ety of an attorney's press conference on behalf of a client who 
had been indicted the day before. The case offered the Court an 
opportunity to formulate a principle of law that would reconcile 
some of the inherent difficulties between the First and Sixth 
Amendments. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution of the is- 
sues presented in Gentile is not entirely satisfactory. But, the 
opinion does recognize the rule that an attorney's speech may 
be regulated more readily than that of the press. 
This note examines the Gentile decision, paying particular 
attention to three of the arguments set forth by Justice 
Kennedy-two of which were rejected by a majority of the 
Court--for limiting a state's right to regulate attorney speech. 
Part I1 summarizes the underlying facts and procedural history 
of the Gentile decision. Part I11 discusses the argument that 
the speech in question was protected "political speech." The 
discussion points out that this was Justice Kennedy's most 
powerful theory and that i t  should have found favor with a 
majority of the Court. Part IV addresses Justice Kennedy's 
argument that the press conference was protected as a valid 
attempt to counteract the publicity already surrounding the 
case and finds this theory wanting. Part V discusses the "void 
for vagueness" argument, which was accepted by a majority of 
the Court. The examination of the Court's holding is designed 
to help attorneys and legislatures understand what extrajuh- 
cia1 speech is protected by the Constitution after this decision. 
Finally, this note concludes that the general rule formulated by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist-that an attorney's speech may be 
regulated more readily than that of the press-is proper, but 
that an exception should be made for attorneys engaged in core 
political speech that does not harm the interests of the accused. 
tion for "low value" and "high value" speech). 
5.  111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). 
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11. A HISTORY OF THE Gentile DECISION 
On January 31, 1987, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department discovered that approximately $300,000 in Ameri- 
can Express Travelers checks and a substantial amount of 
cocaine had been stolen from a safety deposit box a t  the West- 
ern Vault Corporation in Las Vegas. The stolen goods were the 
property of the police, who had used the goods as  part of a n  
undercover operation. Initially, both police officers and employ- 
ees of Western Vault were considered possible suspects. Even- 
tually, however, the officers who had access to the lock box 
were cleared of any charges, and the owner of the storage facil- 
ity, Grady Sanders, was indicted for the crime.6 
Sanders's attorney, Dominic Gentile, ostensibly hoping to 
offset some of the adverse publicity his client had received,' 
held a press conference the day d t e r  the indictment. The crux 
of Gentile's statement a t  this conference was that the trial 
would show that Sanders had been used as a scapegoat by the 
police department, that one of the police officers with access to 
the box was the actual party responsible for the break-in, and 
that the prosecution's witnesses were not credible since some of 
them were known drug dealers.' Six months later, Mr. Sand- 
ers was acquitted by a jury on all counts. After the acquittal, 
the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar rec- 
ommended a private reprimand of Mr. Gentile. The Board 
found that, in holding the press conference, he had violated 
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177. The rule, which is patterned 
from and nearly identical to the ABA's Model Rule of Profes- 
sional Conduct 3.6: prohibits lawyers from making "an extra- 
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be 
6. Brief of Petitioner at 2-7, Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 
89-1836). 
7. Gentile was apparently concerned with the effect of repeated press state- 
ments that the police officers with access to the box had passed polygraph exami- 
nations clearing them of the charges, whereas Mr. Sanders had refused to submit 
to such a test. Polygraph results may not be submitted to the jury in Nevada. The 
administrator of the polygraph examination was later arrested in a cocaine sting 
and the veracity of his polygraph results were called into question. See Brief of 
Petitioner a t  5, 7 n.6, Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836). 
8. Mr. Gentile's prepared statement is set forth in APPENDIX A of Justice 
Kennedy's opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. a t  2736-37. 
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991). For a history 
and general discussion of ABA Rule 3.6 and its predecessors, beginning in 1908, 
see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 633-35 (1986). r 
812 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that i t  will have a substan- 
tial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative pro- 
ceeding."1° 
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Mr. Gentile's First 
Amendment challenge to the private reprimand and affirmed 
the Board's action." The U.S. Supreme Court, however, re- 
versed. The opinion of the Court was a combination of part of 
Justice Kennedy's opinion,12 which favored reversal, and part 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion,13 which advocated af i r -  
mation. Justice O'Connor's concurrence provided a fifth vote for 
parts I11 and VI of Justice K e ~ e d y ' s  opinion and parts I and I1 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.14 Thus, a majority of the 
Court accepted Justice Kennedy's argument that the case 
should be reversed because the statute, as interpreted,15 was 
void for vagueness. No majority, however, was formed to accept 
Justice Kennedy's other arguments in favor of reversal. 
Perhaps the most significant result of the Gentile decision 
is the rejection of Justice Kennedy's argument that the speech 
in  question should have been protected as "political." By not 
accepting this argument, a majority of the Court has essential- 
ly denied to lawyers (albeit in specifk situations) important 
protections previously granted to the general public in some of 
the Court's most significant First Amendment cases. 
Because Gentile's press conference implicated "crooked 
cops," Justice Kennedy argued that the speech was protected as 
10. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(1). The full text of Rule 177 is reprinted in APPEN- 
DM B to Justice Kennedy's opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2737-38. 
11. Gentile v. State Bar, 787 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990). 
12. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 
13. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Scalia and Souter. 
14. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice K e ~ e d y  that the Nevada rule was 
void for vagueness and that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision should be 
reversed. She also agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that a state may regulate a 
lawyer's speech more readily than that of the press and that the "substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice" test, contained in Rule 177, is constitutional 
despite the fad that it is not as speech-protective as the "clear and present dm-  
ger" test traditionally employed by the Court. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2748-49 
(O'Connor, J. concurring). 
15. Justice Kennedy stressed that other similarly worded statutes are not 
affected. The holding is limited to Nevada's particular interpretation of the statu- 
tory standard. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
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"p~litical."'~ "At issue here is the constitutionality of a ban on 
political speech critical of the government and its officials . . . . 
[Tlhis case involves punishment of pure speech in the political 
~oNM."'' 
A. Political Speech Is at the Core 
of First Amendment Protection 
In  First Amendment cases, a court must balance the inter- 
ests served by the speech-limiting regulation against the inter- 
ests of the First Amendment.18 In balancing such interests, 
some forms of protected speech weigh heavier than others. 
A well established principle of constitutional law recog- 
nizes that political speech constitutes the most highly protected 
speech under the First Amendment. In Butterworth v. 
Smith,lg for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a 
Court that found a state statute disallowing grand jury wit- 
nesses from divulging their testimony, even after the grand 
jury investigation was completed, violated the First Amend- 
ment. The statute's scope included testimony regarding impro- 
prieties by public officials, which was the focus of the constitu- 
tional challenge in that case. According to the Chief Justice, 
"the publication of information relating to alleged governmental 
misconduct [is] speech which has traditionally been recognized 
as lying a t  the core of the First A~nendment.'"~ 
Mr. Gentile's accusations against the police, who are gov- 
ernment officials, certainly falls within the meaning of "infor- 
mation relating t o  alleged governmental miscond~ct '~~'  and 
therefore should qualify as core speech. Society has definite 
interests in exposing political corrupt i~n?~ and lawyers are 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. "[Tlhe test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence 
and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then 
to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for 
free and unfettered expression." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829, 843 (1978); see also, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 
(1984). 
19. 494 US. 624 (1990). 
20. Id. at 632. 
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 606 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[C]ommentary on the fact that there is strong evidence 
implicating a government official in criminal activity goes to the very core of 
matters of public concern . . . ."). 
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often in a n  opportune position to perform that function. There- 
fore, any limitations on a lawyer's speech in this regard should 
be subject to First Amendment review. 
B. The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine 
In reviewing limitations on a lawyer's speech, the Court 
should remember certain principles regarding the First 
Amendment's relation to the judicial system that have already 
been enunciated. Because of the "profound national commit- 
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-~pen ,"~~ the "clear and present 
danger"24 doctrine has traditionally governed First Amend- 
ment review. The doctrine was well explained in  the brief of 
petitioner Times-Mirror Co. in Bridges v. Calif0rnia,2~ a case 
invalidating contempt convictions for editorial speech against 
the judicial system, as follows: 
The clear and present danger doctrine requires a weighing of 
the evidence and a determination "whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about" 
a substantial interference with the orderly administration of 
justice.26 
The Bridges decision, which struck down limitations on 
free speech under the clear and present danger test, was reaf- 
firmed in Pennekamp v. Florida2' and Wood v. Georgia:' 
both of which struck down similar limitations on editorial 
speech critical of the judiciary. 
In  Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart:9 the Court found that 
a "clear and present danger" had not been demonstrated and 
invalidated a restraining order that prevented the press from 
reporting on certain aspects of a pending multiple-murder case. 
The Court stated that one of its tasks was to determine wheth- 
er other measures, short of the restraining order, "would have 
23. New York Times ;. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
24. The doctrine was first formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
25. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
26. Id. at 255. Times-Mirror Co. was one of two successful petitioners in this 
case. 
27. 328 U.S. 331 (1946); see also, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
28. 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
29. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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insured the defendant a fair trial."30 Though assuring a fair 
trial through means other than restraining speech may be 
inconvenient, a limitation on free speech must be motivated by 
something that "rises far above public inc~nvenience."~' 
In addition to being in an opportune position to recognize 
political corruption, lawyers are able to provide valuable com- 
mentary on the workings of the public courts. As the Court said 
in Landmark Communications, Inc. u. Virginia,32 a case that 
struck down a Virginia statute making it illegal to report on 
the proceedings of a commission that heard complaints about 
judges: 'The operations of the courts . . . are matters of utmost 
' public concern."33 No less so are the operations of the police, 
who bring criminal matters before the court. "The press does 
not simply publish information about trials but guards against 
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, 
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criti- 
 ism."^^ For these reasons the Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public criminal 
trial.35 
The importance of public knowledge of the workings of the 
court system is one factor the Landmark Court considered 
when it stated that the "Court has consistently rejected the 
argument that [out-of-court] commentary constituted a clear 
and present danger to the administration of justice."36 There 
is "a working principle that the substantive evil must be ex- 
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high 
before utterances can be p ~ n i s h e d . " ~ ~  And, this "danger must 
not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."38 
The dangers of out-of-court commentary are greatest where 
the out-of-court publicity relates to matters that will not be 
30. Id. at 563. 
31. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
32. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
33. Id. at 839. 
34. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (emphasis added). 
35. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (holding that the closure of 
a suppression hearing despite the objections of the accused, is valid only if: (1) 
overriding interests are likely to be prejudiced by an open hearing; (2) closure is 
no broader than necessary; and (3) the trial court considered reasonable alterna- 
tives); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (limiting a 
state's right to close voir dire proceedings in a criminal trial). 
36. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 844. 
37. Brzdges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). 
38. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). 
816 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNNERSI'IY LAW REVIEW [I992 
discussed in the courtroom. Thus, the Court in Sheppard u. 
M a ~ w e l l , ~ ~  which overturned Sam Sheppard's conviction for 
the murder of his wife on the grounds that intensive and unre- 
strained press coverage had limited his chances of a fair trial, 
found it especially compelling that "[mluch of the [prejudicial] 
material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard 
from the witness stand."40 Accordingly, 
in Marshall v. United States . . . we set aside a federal convic- 
tion where the jurors were exposed "through news accounts" 
to information that was not admitted a t  trial. We held that 
the prejudice fiom such material "may indeed be greater" 
than when i t  is part of the prosecution's evidence "for i t  is 
then not tempered by protective pro~edures. ' '~~ 
Unlike the material that was produced in the media and 
never heard at the Sheppard trial, Mr. Gentile's remarks were 
directed towards evidence that he did intend to bring forth at 
trial. Thus, the dangers of out-of-court commentary in this case 
were not as serious as those in Sheppard because the out-of- 
court comments were to be discussed and weighed more fully in 
the courtroom. 
C. Valid and Invalid Limits on a Lawyer's 
First Amendment Rights 
The cases cited thus far deal primarily with the speech 
rights of the press42 during litigation, and not with the rights 
of an attorney. Indeed, "the two major opinions in Nebraska 
Press Association both contain unsupported, conclusory lan- 
guage suggesting that the special protection afforded the press 
might somehow be inapplicable to restraints against defen- 
dants and defense  attorney^."^^ Chief Justice Rehnquist uses 
39. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
40. Id. at 356. 
41. Id. at 351. 
42. Other cases have extended protection to citizens who publish statements 
critical of the government. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (pro- 
tecting a labor leader's publication of a letter critical of a judge). 
43. Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of 
Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 
29 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (1977). This article makes a strong argument for the 
proposition that the Court's rationale in Nebraska Press Ass'n weighs equally in 
favor of allowing defense attorneys the same free speech rights that the case up- 
holds for the press, and that the Court's dictum to the effect that this is not the 
case is unsupported. 
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these statements to support his finding that the clear and pres- 
ent danger test and other principles enunciated therein do not 
apply to attorneys, and that 
lawyers are [not] protected by the First Amendment to the 
same extent as those in other businesses . . . . [Tlhe speech of 
lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulat- 
ed under a less demanding standard than that established for 
regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart and 
the cases which preceded it.44 
That practicing attorneys give up some First Amendment 
protection is undisputed. "Membership in the bar is a privilege 
burdened with  condition^.'"^ "The interest of the States in reg- 
ulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential 
to the primary governmental function of administering justice 
and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' '"' As Justice 
Stewart wrote in a concurring opinion in In re Sc~wyer:~ "A 
lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of 
propriety and honor . . . . He who would follow that calling 
must conform to those standards. Obedience to  ethical precepts 
may require abstention from what in other circumstances 
might be constitutionally protected speech.'"' 
[Tlhe conflict [between the Court's obiter dicta and ratio decidendi] is a 
superficial one, and the compelling analysis underlying Nebraska Press 
Association will require at  least the same heavy presumption against 
prior restraints on the first amendment rights of defendants and their 
attorneys as has been recognized with respect to orders limiting press 
reports of pending litigation. 
Id. at 619. 
44. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion 
of the Court) (citation omitted). Justice K e ~ e d y ,  on the other hand, argues that 
the Nevada test "approximated" the "clear and present danger" test and should be 
interpreted accordingly. Id. at 2725 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., plurality opinion). In re Sazuyer, 
a case overturning the temporary suspension of an attorney for speech regarding 
litigation, presented facts similar to the Gentile case. However, the Court decided 
not to reach the constitutional issue, stating that "since it is clear . . . that the 
finding upon which the suspension rests is not supportable by the evidence ad- 
duced, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of Bridges, Pennekamp, or 
Craig. We do not reach or intimate any conclusion on the constitutional issues 
presented." In re Sawyer, 360 US. 622, 626-27 (1959) (citations omitted). 
45. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (quoting In re Rouss, 116 
N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917)). 
46. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). But cf. Cammer v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (holding that attorneys are not "officers of 
the court" in the same way as are publicly paid court employees). 
47. 360 U.S. 622 (1959). 
48. Id. at 646-47. 
8 18 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
Gentile's speech, however, was not just speech that "might 
be constitutionally protected."49 Rather, it was speech that 
dealt with alleged improprieties on the part of public officials, 
and should be protected as "core" First Amendment speech. The 
underlying principles and rationale of the cases enunciating the 
"clear and present danger" test are strong and important 
enough to  apply even to lawyers when they are engaged in 
such core political speech.50 This argument is especially com- 
pelling in light of more recent cases invalidating professional 
rules regulating even the non-core, commercial speech of attor- 
n e y ~ . ~ ~  
Perhaps the strongest argument against reversing the 
Nevada court's decision on "political speech" grounds, however, 
is that it would force the Supreme Court to prioritize between 
First and Sixth Amendment rights. The Court made it clear in 
Nebraska Press Ass'n that it was unwilling to do thisS2 Ac- 
cording to the facts in Gentile, such a prioritization might not 
be necessary. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by an 
"impartial jury" was designed primarily to protect the accused, 
not the state, or even the judicial system.53 Indeed, ABA Mod- 
49. Id. (emphasis added). 
50. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 632 11.88 ("AU of the opinions in In re 
S a y e r ,  for example, seem to concur that speech by a lawyer abstractly attacking 
rules of law or the administration of justice could not constitutionally be used to 
discipline a lawyer.") (citation omitted). Special rules for prosecutors, or for lawyers 
in general, that do not apply to others may raise questions of "viewpoint discrimi- 
nation which is 'censorship in its purest form' and is 'subjected to the highest 
levels of scrutiny.' " Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press and Free Speech, 
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 904-905 (1990) (footnotes omitted). 
51. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising for legal clinic, so long 
as it is not deceptive, is entitled to First Amendment protection from state regula- 
tion); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (state ethics rule prohib- 
iting lawyer from soliciting by sending letters to potential clients held unconstitu- 
tional). In both of these cases, First Amendment interests prevailed over arguments 
that the maintenance of professionalism or the reputation of the legal system 
required protection from certain types of lawyer speech. This standard prevails in 
other professions as well. E.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Con- 
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating limitation on speech by phar- 
macist, despite rationale concerning the reputation of the profession). However, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist points out, even in these cases a balancing test was 
employed. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
opinion of the Court). 
52. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist came close to  rejecting this principle, however, when he declared that, 
"[flew, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the 
right to a fair trial by 'impartial' jurors." Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at  2745 (emphasis 
added). 
53. Although an impartial jury works both to the benefit of the accused and 
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el Rule 3.6 also seems to have been drafted primarily with the 
rights of the accused in mind.54 The accused in this case, how- 
ever, was, if anything, benefitted by his attorney's behavior. 
This does not matter as far as Rule 177 is concerned, but it 
does suggest a way for the Court to reject the statute itself on 
constitutional grounds and avoid having to hold that the right 
to free speech is more or less important than the right t o  a fair 
trial. 
A principle could be formulated whereby an attorney's 
statements to the press would fall outside the condemnation of 
the rule if they did not prejudice the potential venire against 
the accused and if the speech in question was "directed at  pub- 
lic officials and their conduct in offi~e."~ Mr. Gentile argued 
that the clear and present danger standard that applies to  the 
the state, the Sixth Amendment says, "the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. VI (em- 
phasis added). The superior importance of the rights of the accused is illustrated 
by the procedure allowing an accused to appeal a conviction on due process 
grounds, whereas the state may not appeal an acquittal on similar grounds. For 
example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell the Court held that "[dlue process requires that 
the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given 
the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difFiculty of effacing prejudi-, 
cia1 publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong mea- 
sures to ensure that the balance is. never weighed against the accused." Sheppard 
v. Maxwell 384 U.S. at  333, 362 (1966) (emphasis added). See also Freedman & 
Starwood, supra note 43, at 618 ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair trial to 
the defendant, not to the state, and the defendant's exercise of First Amendment 
rights poses no threat to that guarantee."). 
54. The clearest instance of potential for such interference [with judicial 
proceedings] is prosecutorial comment on a pending case, and occasion- 
al decisions can be found in which a court has applied [the predecessor 
to Rule 3.61 to a prosecuting lawyer for such public comment . . . . 
Moreover, because of the fad  that prosecutor statements are typically 
much more likely to influence prospective jurors, Rule 3.6 . . . can be 
violated more readily by prosecutors in criminal cases than by defense 
lawyers or by lawyers in any other setting. 
WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at  634-35; see also Matheson, supra note 50 at  868-69 
("[Ilt is the prosecutor's extrajudicial publicizing, not defense counsel's, that might 
imperil the defendant's fair trial right."). 
55. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. a t  2724 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., plurality opinion). Other com- 
mentators have argued that defense attorneys in general should be afforded immu- 
nity from extrajudicial speech limitations. See, e.g., Freedman & Starwood, supra 
note 43. The rule proposed herein would have much the same effect but would 
limit the scope of such arguments to speech not only made on behalf of the ac- 
cused but that also furthers "core" or political expression. For an opinion more 
akin to this argument see Richard B. Hirst, Comment, Silence Orders: Preserving 
Political Expression by Defendants and their Lazuyers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
595 (1971) (arguing that defense attorneys should not be subject to silence orders 
in cases involving indictments that are politically motivated). 
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press should also apply to him in this case.56 Gentile's propos- 
al, though, only makes it more difficult for lawyers to be disci- 
plined. I t  does not consider whether the speech in question is 
"core speech" or is furthering society's interest in exposing 
political corruption. The rule formulated above, however, has 
an  advantage over the clear and present danger standard in 
dealing with lawyers. I t  advances society's strong interest in 
exposing political corruption while protecting the accused from 
negative pretrial publicity. 
This rule would be a valid exception to the general rule 
allowing regulation of attorney speech on pending litigation. 
The Court has recognized such "political speech" exceptions to 
restrictions on lawyer speech before. For example, although the 
Court upheld a regulation on direct solicitation of clients in 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar A ~ s h , ~ ?  the Court also carved out 
an  exception to this rule for solicitations that furthered "politi- 
cal" causes in In re P r i r n ~ s . ~ ~  
The Prinus case,involved solicitation by an ACLU attorney 
of a possible client in an anti-sterilization case. According to 
the Court, "This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary 
gain. Appellant was communicating an  offer of free assis- 
tance . . . . And her actions were undertaken to express per- 
sonal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objec- 
tives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain."59 If a 
"political speech" exception can be carved from a general rule 
upholding state anti-solicitation regulations, so too, can such an 
exception be carved from a general rule upholding state regula- 
tions against an attorney's comments on pending litigation. 
In part I1 of his opinion, Justice Kennedy details the great 
amount of adverse publicity Mr. Sanders received prior to his 
indictment, together with the favorable publicity received by 
56. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2742 (&hnquist, C.J., opinion of the Court); but see 
supra text accompanying note 44. 
57. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
58. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
59. Id. at 422 (emphasis added); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963). In Button, the Court held that the NAACPs attempts to advance civil 
rights goals by explaining those goals to potential clients may not be penalized 
under state anti-solicitation rules. Id. This case was relied on in In re Primus, 436 
U.S. 412 (1978). 
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the police.60 Justice Kennedy noted that, "[flar from an admis- 
sion that he sought to 'materially prejudic[e] an adjudicative 
proceeding,' petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity 
he perceived as prejudicing potential jurors against his client 
and injuring his client's reputation in the comm~nity."~' 
A. A Lawyer's Role in- Highly Publicized Cases 
Justice Kennedy's arguments paint an admirable picture of 
a lawyer battling against the unfair forces lined in opposition 
t o  his client. "An attorney's duties do not begin inside the 
courtroom door."62 Perhaps especially compelling is the argu- 
ment that Mr. Gentile's client had suffered great personal and 
economic harm as a result of the adverse publicity before the 
case, and that the press conference in his favor helped to allevi- 
ate this. The strength of this argument, however, is weakened 
by the self-contradictory nature of the statement that a lawyer 
is in fact not trying to  prejudice a proceeding, but is merely 
trying to counter already existing prejudice. The battle is to  be 
fought in the courtroom, and the fact that one side has broken 
this rule by engaging in out-of-court commentary doesn't give 
the other side clearance to do the same. "Legal trials are not 
like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, 
the radio, and the ne~spaper?~  "The theory of our system is 
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced 
only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any 
outside influence, whether of private talk or public ~ r i n t . ' ~  
A committee of the New York Bar that met to formulate a 
statute similar to  Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, discussed 
the issue of whether an attorney, when faced with publicity 
adverse to his client, should be able to use the press to fight 
back, and concluded as follows: 
At first blush, it may seem reasonable enough to permit 
a lawyer to fight fire with fire, but a moment's reflection 
60. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727-28 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., plurality opinion). Such treat- 
ment is apparently routine in criminal cases because reporters tend to rely on law 
enforcement for their sources. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 50, at 890 n.143 ("It 
is well established that reporters get most of their crime news from law enforce- 
ment sources."). 
61. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
62. Id. 
63. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). 
64. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
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will make it apparent that even the-publication of an in- 
dictment may be thought to justify defense counsel in 
publishing his version of the merits, what defense wit- 
nesses will testify, and so on. Once the interchange of 
publicity has begun, there is no way to stop it or in 
many if not most cases even to tell when or how it be- 
gan. 65 
Rather than fighting back in the press, the attorney's pri- 
mary responsibility is to assure that a fair trial is had despite 
any prior adverse publicity. Various means are at the disposal 
of the lawyer and the court to  accomplish this, including voir 
dire, change of venue, instructing the jury to disregard press 
reports about the trial, and even after-trial appeals based on a 
tainted jury. 
B. The Difficulty of Ignoring an Adversary's Press Statements 
On the other hand, voir dire, change of venue, and other 
such methods do not always assure that the accused will re- 
ceive a fair trial. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 
Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir 
dire, change of venue, or some other device, these measures 
entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir dire may not 
be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and 
with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal 
trials, a change of venue may not suffice to undo the effects of 
[pre-trial] statements . . . .66 
Furthermore, in cases like Gentile, prosecutors can make 
highly prejudicial statements to the press, and be protected 
under subdivision 3(b) of the Nevada rule,6' so long as their 
statements came from the defendant's indictment-a public 
record. As Justice K e ~ e d y  pointed out, considerations other 
than the fairness of the trial also need to  be examined. In up- 
holding a restraint on pretrial publicity, for example, the Fed- 
65. SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, ASSOCI- 
ATION OF THE BAR OF THE ClTY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR 
TRIAL: FINAL REPOW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (i967). 
66. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., opinion 
of the Court). Although the Chief Justice does not acknowledge it, this argument, 
which he makes against Gentile's position, cuts both ways. 
67. "Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investiga- 
tion or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: . . . [tlhe information 
contained in a public record . . . ." NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(3)(b). 
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eral District Court for the Southern District of New York, in 
United States u. Sirn~n,~' pointed to the plight of a defendant 
in a highly publicized case, who, after his acquittal, wanted to 
know "where he might go to have his reputation restored to  
him?' The court elaborated: 
In the aftermath of a celebrated trial, members of the public 
may come to believe that certain defendants were acquitted 
not because of their innocence, but rather, because of a 
prosecutor's incompetence or tactical error, the fame or ora- 
torical skill of defense counsel, or even because of vaguely 
understood concepts of the 'legal technicality' through which 
an otherwise guilty individual escapes the grasp of justi~e.'~ 
Despite their shortcomings and costs, however, voir dire, 
change of venue and other such methods are the means that 
have been created to deal with negative pretrial publicity. The 
efficacy of these tools is uncertain. But equally uncertain is the 
effectiveness of an attorney's statements to the press as a tool 
for offsetting previous statements by the other side. Conse- 
quently, Justice Kennedy's argument that Gentile's statement 
should be protected because it countered prejudice was rightful- 
ly rejected by a majority of the Court. 
V. VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
A. The Argument 
That the statute in question is vague on its face is a diffi- 
cult argument to overcome. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(2) 
lists several types of statements that are likely to be prohibited 
under the rule. These include statements relating to, "[tlhe 
character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a par- 
ty .  . . or witness," as well as "[alny opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case."71 Rule 
177(3) then lists statements a lawyer may make "without elab- 
oration"; these include "[tlhe general nature of. . . the de- 
f e n ~ e . " ~ ~  Gentile found, as would any defense attorney whose 
strategy revolved around the credibility of witnesses and the 
innocence of his own client, that the prohibitions of Rule 177(2) 
68. 664 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
69. Id. at 789 11.13. 
70. Id. 
71. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(2). 
72. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(3). 
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were difficult to reconcile with Rule 177(3)'s authorization of a 
statement on the general nature of the defense. 
A majority of the Court held that the rule was void for 
vagueness because a reasonable attorney had no way of know- 
ing whether a statement would be protected under the Rule 
177(3) safe harbor, for statements regarding the "general na- 
ture" of the defense, or whether it  would be construed as an 
"elaboration," forbidden under Rule 177(1). Thus, the rule met 
the traditional test for vagueness because people "of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its appli~ation."~~ 
B. Can an Attorney Speak to the Press "Safe1y"After Gentile? 
The Court's void-for-vagueness ruling is a step in the right 
direction and will probably curtail some overly vigorous en- 
forcement of ABA Model Rule 3.6, as enacted by the various 
states.?* Whether Gentile offers any real guidance to attorneys 
who wish t o  hold a press conference or speak to reporters with- 
out violating the rule is unclear. Any guidelines the case offers 
are ambiguous a t  best. 
Nevertheless, some points are worth noting. For example, 
Mr. Gentile's testimony that he thought his statements were 
protected under Rule 177(3) seemed to weigh very favorably 
with the Court. Passages from Mr. Gentile's conference are 
given to show his "attempt to obey the rule."75 When asked if 
he could elaborate on some of the statements, Mr. Gentile re- 
plied, "I can't because ethics prohibit me from doing so. Last 
night before I decided I was going to make a statement, I took 
a close look at the rules of professional responsibility. There 
are things that I can say and there are things that  I can't. 
0 k a ~ ? " ~ '  
73. C o ~ a l l y  v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
74. According to WOLFTUM, supra note 9, at 635, many decisions have upheld 
Rule 3.6's predecessor statute, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R E S P O N S I B I ~  DR
7-107, against free-speech, vagueness and overbreadth attacks. One case went so 
far as to  refbe admission pro hac vice to a lawyer previously in violation of the 
rule. State v. Ross, 304 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 
(1974). Another condemned a lawyer for encouraging a juror to talk to the media 
about a completed case. State v. Young, 438 A.2d 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1381). 
75. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991) ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., opinion of 
the Court). 
76. Id. 
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Thus, even though Gentile's opening statement may have 
violated some of the taboos set forth in rule 177(2), the fact 
that he refused to answer some of the questions on grounds 
that his reading of the rule precluded him from doing so al- 
lowed the Court to  hold that he had made a good faith effort to  
stay within the safe harbor. The Court stated, "The fact Gentile 
was found in violation of the Rules after studying them and 
making a conscious effort at compliance demonstrates that 
Rule 177 creates a trap for the wary as well as the un~ary."~' 
A lawyer wishing to hold a press conference under Nevada 
Rule 177, or a similar rule, would thus be wise to  let it be 
known at the press conference that he has studied the ethical 
rule in question and is making a good faith effort to  follow its 
 precept^.'^ In states like Nevada, which have no common law 
or further interpretations of the rule, such actions may assure 
at  least some defense to any charges of violations of the rule on 
void-for-vagueness grounds. This suggests the need for the 
states, either legislatively or in the courts, to formulate clearer 
guidelines. Nevertheless, the best rule for attorneys is to pro- 
ceed with caution.79 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The rule formulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Gentile 
that allows a state t o  "regulate speech by lawyers representing 
clients . . . more readily than it may regulate the press,"80 and 
thus to ignore the rigid "clear and present danger" test in its 
restrictions on attorney speech is supported by important poli- 
cies. It is a principle that should not be cast aside simply to 
allow lawyers to fight pretrial fire with fire. However, "[tlhis 
does not mean . . . that lawyers forfeit their First Amendment 
rights . . . ."81 When core political speech is involved, a narrow 
77. Id. at 2732. 
78. United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1991), one of 
the f rs t  attorney disciplinary actions to cite Gentile in dealing with a lawyer's 
statements to the press, shows that if an attorney offers no excuse for "knowingly" 
and "willfully" violating a similar rule, courts will not hesitate to impose a penalty. 
The Binghum decision also discussed with approval Justice Kennedy's opinion that 
the timing of the attorney's statements are an important consideration. Id. at 1044- 
45. Statements made close to the eve of trial seem more likely to be reprimanded. 
79. This is especially true now that Justice Marshall, who sided with Justice 
Kennedy, has left the Court. 
80. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2748 (O'Co~or ,  J. concurring). 
81. Id. 
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exception should be carved from Chief Justice Rehnquist's gen- 
eral rule that would allow attorneys to engage in such speech 
so long as the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused are not 
damaged by this speech. Such a rule would allow the press a 
head start in pursuing claims of political corruption, while at 
the same time protecting the right of the accused to be tried by 
a jury that is not poisoned against him. 
D. Christopher AZbright 
